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IV.
BOOK I.-GENERAL PROVISIONS.
Capacity.-The French Code fixes the age of majority at twenty-
one for both sexes (Art. 388). The Japanese Code fixes it at
twenty. In Japan in feudal times the Samurai was expected to ren-
der military service at fifteen. According to the conscription laws
which are now in force the duty of every subject to render military
service commences at the age of twenty. 'It will thus be seen that the
framers of the Japanese Code simply followed the existing law.
The French Code recognizes a middle status between minors and
persons of full majority, which may be called emancipated minority
(Book I, tit. X, ch. III). Such emancipation may take place by
the marriage of minors or by the declaration of the father or in the ab-
sence of the father, the declaration of the mother, in favour of minors
who have reached the age of fifteen. In the German Code majority is
fixed at twenty, but minors who have reached the age of eighteen
may be declared to be of full capacity by decree of court. These
exceptions are founded on necessity and in some shape are found in
the legislation of nearly all countries. Japan has chosen to leave it to
the discretion of minors' legal representatives, to authorize minors
to administer their own property or to transact business without any
interference on the part of the courts (Arts. 5, 6). The legal repre-
sentatives may define the sphere of action permitted to the minors,
and they may withdraw the authorization after granting it, if they
believe that the franchise works harm to the minors. We have, in
my opinion, selected a plan which on the one hand is simple and on
the other meets all requirements.
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According to Art. 224 of the French Code, an authorization of the
court is necessary for the wife of a minor to enter into contract or
to sue in a court of law. In this case, too, we have dispensed with
the interference of the courts. Our Code provides, in Art. I8, that a
minor husband may, with the consent of the legal representatives,
give validity to the acts of his wife.
Art. 1307 of the French Code, provides that a mere declaration
by a minor, of his majority, does not prevent him from avoiding
acts done under such declaration. On the other hand Art. 20 of the
Japanese Code, is to the effect that if a person without legal capacity
uses fraud for the purpose of causing it to be believed that he has
such capacity, he is estopped from pleading his incapacity in avoid-
ance of acts thus performed by him. The term "a person without
legal capacity" is used in order to include -persons other than minors.
Domicile.-The principal place where a person lives is regarded
as his domicile (Art. 21). This is the definition of the Japanese
Code and in effect is the same as the French, viz., the domicile of
every Frenchman, in regard to the exercise of his rights, is at the
place where he has his principal establishment. The German Civil
Code defines the domicile as the place where a person always lives,
As to the question whether a person can have several domiciles
at the same time the jurisprudence of different countries indicates
considerable dissimilarity. The German Civil Code expressly states
that a person may have several domiciles at the same time. It is
clear from the definition of domicile above cited that the Japanese
Code takes the contrary view, for no person can have more than one
principal place of living. Still this does not prevent a person from
acquiring a special domicile for a specific purpose. The French
Code presumes that a person retains his domicile until he acquires a
new one. In the Japanese Code, where a person has given up his old
domicile and has not yet acquired a new one, the place of residence
is to be regarded as his domicile.
Disappearance.-In regard to persons who are absent or have
disappeared, the French Code, in Art. 112 and in subsequent articles,
divides absence into three periods and makes different provisions for
each-period. In the first period, or period of presumptive absence,
the chief aim of the law is to protect the interests of the absentee.
In the second period, or the period of declared absence, the same
object is had in view, but the interests of the interested parties are
also taken into consideration and would be successors are placed in
possession of property left by the absentee. In the third period such
possession becomes ownership. However, there is no legal presump-
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tion of death even in the third period. It will be observed that in
the French Code, as soon as a person leaves his domicile or residence
and his whereabouts becomes unknown, he comes under the operation
of the law relating to absentees. In this we have not followed the
French law. The Japanese Code provides for the protection of prop-
erty of persons who have disappeared, but after the lapse of a certain
period, on the application of an interested party, the Court makes
what is called an adjudication of disappearance, which is equivalent
to a declaration of the death of the missing person, and has all the
legal consequences of actual death, not only in regard to his prop-
erty, but also his personal relations.
Artificial or Juridical Persons.-There is no mention of juridical
persons or corporations in the French Civil Code, although there are
provisions in the Commercial Code for the incorporation of commer-
cial bodies. Nevertheless modem society has recognized the necessity
of corporate organizations for purposes other than those that are
purely commercial. The Japanese Civil Code devotes Arts. 33, 34
to this subject. Two kinds of juridical persons are recognized, viz.,
association (Shadan), and trusts (Zaidan). The objects for which
these corporations may be formed are defined in Arts. 34 and 35. If
formed for religious worship or teaching, for charity, for education,
for art or for any purposes beneficial to the public, and the object of
which is not to make a profit out of the conduct of their business, they
come into existence in virtue of permission of the competent author-
ities. But if formed for the purposes of profit, they are obliged to
comply with the conditions prescribed for the creation of commercial
companies.
Things.-The Roman jurisconsults divided things into corporeal
and incorporeal. By corporeal things they meant: Ist, Things strictly
so called, that is external tangible objects, not persons. 2nd, Per-
sons considered as subjects of rights and duties. 3rd, Acts and for-
bearances considered as objects of rights and duties. Incorporeal
things consisted of rights and duties themselves, e. g. jus hereditatis,
ius servitutis, obligationes quoquo modo contractae. This classifica-
tion is followed in the French Code and to a certain extent finds rec-
ognition in the English common law. But no practical advantages
flow from this division. On the contrary, by thus bracketing
together the subjects of rights and rights themselves, by thus bring-
ing under the same head things which belong wholly to different
species, a confusion of ideas becomes unavoidable and the logical
distinction of rights in rem and rights in personam is obscured. The
Japanese Civil Code adopts the simple and original meaning of the
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term "things" and applies it exclusively to material objects (Art.
85).
Expression of Intention.-In the French Code, the principles
relating to expression of intention are treated under the heading of
agreements (consentement). But correctly speaking the question
of the expression of intention is not limited to agreements. It has
an equally important relation to unilateral and other legal acts, and
therefore in the Japanese Code it is placed in Book I, where legal
principles common to all legal acts are enunciated. The French Code
provides that contracts founded on error are voidable, but does not
make them void ab initio, and it also enumerates cases in which such
contracts can be avoided. The provision of the point in the German
Code is to the effect that in cases where, if there had been no error,
there would have been no expression of intention, such expression is
void ab initio. The enumeration of cases in the French Code may
not be sufficient to meet all contingencies likely to arise under vary-
ing circumstances, while to decide by the consideration of subjective
reasons, as in the German Code, would unnecessarily increase litiga-
tion. The Japanese Civil Code provides that if in an expression of
intention, a mistake in the essential elements of legal acts is made
the expression is void, thus dispensing with the enumeration and the
subjective consideration of the state of mind of the parties.
Regarding an expression of intention made to a person in another
place, the question when it begins to produce a legal effect is an
important but difficult one. On this point the opinions of jurists
differ and there is a lack of uniformity in legislative precedents.
No special provision on the subject exists in the French Code. The
Japanese Code adopts as a general principle the rule that an expres-
sion of intention made to a person at a distance takes effect from the
time that notice reaches him (Art. 97), but exception is made in the
case of contracts between persons living in different places. In
such cases contracts are concluded when notice of acceptance is de-
spatched. On theoretical grounds the general principle is to be rec-
ommended, but in practice, and especially in business matters, it
would be more convenient and more conducive to the interests of the
parties- to have their rights and duties determined with as little delay
as possible. Besides, the speed and certainty of modem means of
communication leave little danger as to the miscarriage of notices
of acceptance.
Agents.-The French Code treats agency and mandates under
the same head in Book III, Tit. 13. But agency is created not by
contract alone. In many cases it is the result of the operation of
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law. The Japanese Code is right in placing general provisions relat-
ing to agency in Book I, and giving a special place to mandates as
a species of contract, in Book III. As to the effect of the cessation
of an agent's powers with respect to third persons, Art. 112 of the
Japanese Code provides that the extinction of the right of representa-
tion cannot be set up against a third person acting in good faith; but
this does not apply if the third person is ignorant of the fact by
reason of his own negligence. This is materially the same as the
provisions of the French Code. The German Code goes further and
declares that a third person must be notified of the fact of such
extinction in order that it may be set up against him (Art. 17o,
171, 172). It may be questioned whether the German Code does not
go too far in its endeavor to protect the rights of third persons.
Acts that are void and voidable.-According to Art. 13o4 of the
French Code the decree of a court is essential to nullify or to rescind
a contract. Regarding acts which are void it is provided in the
Japanese Code that acts void in themselves do not acquire validity
by ratification, but if a party to an act ratifies it knowing its invalidity,
such ratification is regarded as the performance of a fresh act. As
to the manner of rescinding a voidable act, the Japanese Code, like
the German Code, has adopted a simpler course by providing, in
Art. 123, that in cases where the other party to a voidable act is speci-
fied, rescission is effected by an expression of intention made to him.
Conditions.-The time when the enjoyment of a right is to begin
or to end may be made to depend on events. The French Code pro-
vides that such an event must in fact be a future and an uncertain one.
According to the Japanese Code an event may be made a condition,
the happening of which is uncertain to the parties. But it is not
necessary that it should be a future event because from one point of
view nothing in this world is precarious. Everything may be said
to have its predestined end. But, subjectively considered, to human
eyes many things are uncertain, and consequently there is no reason
why such events should not be made conditions for beginning or
ending the enjoyment of rights. Art. 131 provides that "when the
condition has already happened at the time of the legal act, the latter
is unconditionally valid if the condition is precedent, and is void if
the condition is subsequent," thus showing that the condition need not
necessarily be a future event.
As to the effect of the fulfilment of the condition, Art. 1179, of
the French Code, enacts "la condition accomplie a un effet r6troactif
au jour auquel 1engagement a t6 contracti, si le cr~ancier est mort
avant l'accomplissement de la condition, ses droits passent d son
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h~ritier." According to the German Code the condition does not
relate back to the date of the contract (Art. 158). The opinions of
jurists on this point differ. The Japanese Code provides as a general
principle that an act subject to a condition precedent takes effect
from the time of the happening of the condition and does not relate
back to the date of the contract. But where there is an express
agreement to the contrary, legal effect is given to such an agreement
(Art. 127). It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that laws
have no retroactive effect; and so with reference to legal acts it is
ordinarily wise to confine their effect to the future; for by giving
them a retroactive effect not only complicated questions may arise
between the parties, but the rights of third persons may be dis-
turbed.
Prescription.-The French Code treats of prescription in Book
III as a mode of acquiring ownership and the German Code places
extinctive prescription in Book I (General Rules), and acquisitive
prescription in Book III (Rights in Rem). Prescription does not
relate to ownership alone, neither does acquisitive prescription have
exclusive reference to rights in rem. Consequently neither
the French nor the German arrangement seems to be satis-
factory. As to the nature of prescription there are two ways of
viewing it. It may be considered as the presumption of law in regard
to the acquisition of rights or extinction of duties, in fact, as a princi-
ple of the law of evidence; or it may be considered as a title for the
acquisition of rights and a cause for the extinction of duties. The
Japanese Code has adopted the latter theory and enacts that the pos-
session of a thing with an intention of owning it for a certain period
creates a title of ownership, and the non-user of a right for a. certain
period extinguishes the right.
The raison d'etre of prescription is that property should be
entrusted to the persons who take good care of it and who are likely
to make improvements upon it, to the indirect benefit of the nation,
and should not be left to persons who do not make profitable use of
it. It seems reasonable therefore that prescription should be made
a title for acquiring ownership and a cause for losing it, rather than
that it should be treated as a mere matter of evidence. As to mov-
ables, by Art. 2279, of the French Code, the principle "possession
vaut titre" is recognized. The same principle is recognized in the
Japanese Code, but not on the ground of prescription. The provi-
sion on the subject is found in Art. 192, wherein the right to exercise
the right of ownership is treated as a consequence of peaceable pos-
session in good faith. Time being an essential element in the theory
359
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of prescription, it does not seem logical to say that a title over a mov-
able is acquired at the same time with the act of possession, on the
theory of prescription. In respect to rights in personam the French
Code does not recognize acquisitive prescription, but there is no
reason why it should be confined to rights in rem and the Japanese
Code has wisely made it applicable to rights in personam as well as
to rights in rem.
V.
BooK II. RIGHTS IN REM.
Different kinds of Rights in Rem.-Rights in rem recognized by
the Japanese Civil Code are nine in number. They are: Possession;
Ownership; Superficies; Emphyteusis; Easements or Servitudes;
Liens; Preferential Rights; Pledges, and Mortgages. In the
French Civil Code, Possessions and Liens are not considered as
rights in rem, nor does it recognize Superficies or Emphyteusis.
On the other hand Usufruct, Use and Habitation occupy important
places. Usufruct is defined to be a right to enjoy 'the property
belonging to another, in the same manner as the owner, without con-
suming the substance itself. It may be created by law or the will
of the parties, and may have relation to any kind of property, either
movable or immovable. Use is a species of usufruct, the right to
enjoy it being restricted to oneself and one's own family. Habita-
tion or the right of residence is a species of use exercised in respect
of a house (Arts. 578, 625, 631, 633). Hence use and habitation are
rights which can not be sublet or assigned. These rights are created
in France for the benefits of women. A daughter is about to marry:
her father desires to give her dowry. Should he give her money
she may readily spend it; should he give her absolute ownership
of land or building she may be induced to sell it. A husband desires
to provide for his wife after his death; the same reason obtains here,
supplemented by the consideration that he may not care to pass his
property entirely to his wife's kin. By creating usufruct in favor
of a daughter or a widow, provision is made for her and at the same
time the rights of the heirs are not impaired. It is necessary to
make this species of right a right in rem. Otherwise if the property
affected should pass to third persons, the right in question would
not be available against such third persons, and the wife might
consequently be deprived of her portion or the widow might be left
penniless. By making it a right in rem, that is, making it good
against all the world, the main object is secured, regardless of all
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changes in actual ownership. On economical grounds, however,
the advantage of such a right is to be questioned; for the person
who is in the enjoyment of such a right, considering that the property
over which the right is established must sooner or later revert to the
owner, would naturally be slow to make any permanent improve-
ments. On the contrary he might not hesitate to extract a maximum
of profit with a minimum of thought for the permanent interest of
the property. Again, an owner who is not in the present enjoyment
of his property will not incur expenses the benefit of which may or
may not accrue to himself. Thus nature which ought to be made
to contribute its full measure to the wants of man, is only half util-
ized and the result is not only 'individually uneconomical to the
parties concerned, but injurious to society of which they are con-
ponents. It is undesirable, therefore, that such a right should be
created if the desired object may be attained by other method, and
there are such methods by which provisions can be made for persons
in the situations above referred to. Annuities may be granted or
rights in personam secured by mortgage may be given. It is not
absolutely necessary to resort to so questionable a system as Usu-
fruct, Use or Habitation. Many countries have done without it.
The people governed by Anglo-American jurisprudence are not
aware of it. They have attained the desired result by laws relating
to trust,--a creature of equity peculiar to that jurisprudence.
Hence Usufruct, Use and Habitation of the French Code, which
were also found in the Japanese Code of 189o form no part of the
Code we are now considering.
General Provisions relating to Rights in Re.-For the creation
of rights in ren the Roman law made it a condition that certain
prescribed forms should be complied with, so in the English law
deeds were necessary in order to establish certain rights. The
German Code (Arts. 873, 929) also requires compliance with pre-
scribed forms for the creation of rights in rem. The French Code
(Art. 1583), treating of sale, provides that the sale is complete
between the parties as soon as there is an agreement as to the thing
and the price. The history of jurisprudence shows a marked dis-
tinction between ancient and modern practice in the fact that
formerly there was a strict adherence to forms while the present
tendency is in the direction of simplification. A glance at the old
English common law practice and the present code practice will
show the truth of this statement. The Japanese Civil Code (Art.
i76) boldly enunciates the principle that the creation and transfer
of rights in rem derive their validity solely from the expression of
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intention of the parties. Articles 177 and 178 make registration, in
case of immovables and delivery in case of movables, essential in
order to make the right available against third persons. It is to be
observed that this requirement,-registration or delivery-is abso-
lutely essential, or in other words, that in order to set up a right
in rein against third persons, registration or delivery, as the case
may be, must have been actually effected. It is no answer to say
that the third person had knowledge of the transaction.
Right of Possession.-The French Code treats of possession
under the heading of Prescription. The Japanese Code gives it a
special place as a species of rights in rem. Possession, apart from
being a footing for the establishment of other important rights, is in
itself a right worthy of the protection of law. According to Roman
law and the codes based upon that system, possession is defined
to be the holding of a thing with an intention to acquire the owner-
ship thereof. This definition is clearly too narrow, since the deten-
tion of a thing by a pledge or the holding of a thing under a contract
of letting and hiring for instance, would equally be possession,
although lacking the intention on the part of the possessor to acquire
ownership. Yet such possession ought to be an object of the law's
solicitude. The Japanese Code uses these words: "The right of
possession is acquired by holding a thing with intention of doing so
on one's own behalf." Thus possessory right is extended to all
cases where a person holds a thing for his own benefit, irrespective
of the question whether he has an intention to hold it as an owner
or not.
The French definition of possession (Art. 2228) may be rendered
thus: "Possession is the detention or enjoyment, of a thing or a
right, which we hold or exercise ourselves or by another who holds
or exercises it in our name." To call the exercise of a right, a
possession betrays laxity of expression inconsistent with good legis-
lation. We have confined the term "possession" to a right over a
thing and, as I have said before, the word thing is limited to its
ordinary signification; it therefore became necessary to introduce
into the Japanese Code a separate section entitled Quasi-Possession,
where in it is enacted that the provisions of the chapter relating to
Right of Possssion shall extend to cases where a person exercises
rights over property with the intention of doing so on his own
behalf. By this means all the provisions relating to the possession
of a thing are extended to the exercise of rights over property. In
the earlier Roman law the principle of quasi-possession was applied
only to the exercise of the right of servitude. Later it was extended
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not only to the exercise of all property right, but also to rights
arising out of family relations and even of religion. Similarly in
the French Code the application of this principle is not limited to
property rights, but rights arising out of personal status may be
made the subject of this right (French Code, Arts. 195, 196, 322).
The extended application of this species of right to rights other
than property rights, has been condemned by modem jurists. For
instance, the doctrine of quasi-possession as applied to the right of a
husband would be derogatory to modem notions of good morals and
public order. Accordingly in the Japanese Code, as has already been
remarked, the principle is made applicable only to the property
rights.
Rights over Animals not Domestic.-With reference to the right
of animals not domestic, the French Code contains a peculiar pro-
vision. In the 2d section of the chapter treating of Accession in
respect of immovables, there appears a clause to the following effect:
"Pigeons, rabbits and fish, which betake themselves to cots, warrens
and ponds owned by another person, belong to such other person
provided no fraud or artifice had heen employed to entice them."
Without stopping to enquire why pigeons and rabbits have been
selected in preference to other birds and quadrupeds, it is difficult
to conceive how the principle of accession can logically be made to
apply such cases. The theory of accession is that where two or
more things are united in such a manner that they can not be
separated, or that separation would cause deterioration, depreciation
or unreasonable expense, the ownership of the whole should devolve
on the person who owned one of the things before the union was
effected. Pigeons, rabbits and fish may be easily separated without
any damage either to themselves or to their cots, warrens or ponds,
and consequently there does not seem to be any good reason why the
law should step in and deprive the former owners of their proprie-
tory rights. The Japanese Code prescribes the effect of possession
of non-domestic animals in the following terms: "A person who
possesses an animal other than a domestic animal, which was
formerly kept by another acquires the rights he exercises over it, if
in the beginning of his possession he acted in good faith, and if within
one month from the date of its escape he receives no demand from
its former keeper." It will thus be seen that in this instance, accord-
ing to Japanese law, the acquisition of rights is based on the fact of
possession.
Possessory and Petitory Actions.-A possessory action is an action
based on the mere fact of possesion, while a petitory action is a suit
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founded on the legal right of possession independently of the fact
of possession. Upon the question whether the two actions should
be concurrently allowed, the legislative precedents differ and the
French and Japanese enactments on the point are diametically
opposed to each other. Article 202 of the Japanese Code provides
that possessory and petitory actions do not preclude each other
and that a possessory action cannot be decided upon grounds
giving rise to a petitory action. The French law bearing or the
subject is found in Articles 25, 26 and 27 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. It. is there provided that possessory and petitory actions can
not be brought together, that the plaintiff in a petitory action can not
be plaintiff in a possessory action, and that the defendant in a
possessory action can not bring a petitory suit until after the termina-
tion of the possessory action. According to the Japanese Code,
possessory and petitory actions are considered quite independent of
each other. An action for the recovery of possession may be based
on the mere ground of possession or on grounds other than the fact
of possession. Thus the action may be the same while the grounds
are different. Even a thief may, under circumstances, claim the
right of possession. Consequently the right of possession may be
considered, and ought to be protected, independently of the right of
ownership, or of any lesser right of a thing.
Ownership.-According to Article 544 of the French Code, owner-
ship is defined to be the right to enjoy and dispose of property, in
the most absolute manner, provided the laws and regulations are
not violated thereby. The sufficiency of this definition of ownership
is questionable, for ownership may exist without the right of enjoy-
-ment. The Japanese Code, without attempting to define ownership,
simply states what an owner can do. The chapter on this subject is
divided into three sections, viz.: Limits of ownership; Acquisition
of ownership, and Joint ownership. The first section opens with the
proposition that an owner has, within the limits prescribed by law,
the right freely to use, profit by, and deal with the thing he owns.
It next declares that the right of ownership of land subject to the
restrictions imposed by law, extends to what is above and below the
rule: "si utere tuo ut alienum! non laedas." This section also deals
with the question of the right to use the land of a neighboring owner,
e. g., Article 21o declares that when a piece of land is surrounded by
another piece of land so as to prevent access to the public highway,
the owner of the former land is entitled to an outlet over the sur-
rounding land, and Article 214 enacts that the owner of land must
THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN.
not interfere with the natural flow of water from adjoining land.
These rights are styled in the French law, servitudes created by law,
and they are dealt with under the heading of servitudes. The
French Code contains no separate section relating to limits of
ownership, consequently it was necessary to describe these rights as
servitudes created by law and to class them with those created by
the consent of the parties.
The Japanese and French Codes similarly provide that when
several movable things belonging to different persons are so united
that they can not be separated without injury, the whole or composite
thing belongs to the owner of the principal movable. The French
Code, however, lays down minute criteria for determining which is
the principal and which the accessory thing. The thing for whose
use, ornament or complement, another thing has been united to it is,
according to the French law, to be regarded as the principal thing.
If these criteria are wanting, then the more valuable is to be regarded
as the principal; if the values are equal, then the larger in size is to
be considered. The framers of the Japanese Code, deeming the
question of principal and accessory to be one of fact, thought it would
be unwise to enter too much into details. Accordingly Japanese
law leaves the solution of the question entirely to the discretion of
judges who, it is presumed, are best able to do substantial justice
in each case, and when it is impossible to determine which is the
principal and which the accessory, the composite thing is held in
joint ownership.
Superficies and Emphyteusis.-A superficiary is one who has
the right to use the land of another person for the purpose of owning
thereon buildings, or bamboos and trees. This is the definition of
the Japanese Civil Code. It is a right to use the land of another,
and its object is limited to the ownership of buildings, or bamboos
and trees. Bamboos and trees (chikuboku in Japanese) is a peculiar
expression used to denote grasses, bushes, bamboos and trees, that
is, all kinds of plants found in Japanese gardening. This species
of right is created for residential purposes. For agricultural pur-
poses, a similar right under the name of emphyteusis is established.
There is no special provision in the French Code concerning super-
ficies, and French jurists differ widely as to the nature of the right.
Some maintain that it is ownership while others try to explain it as
possession, that is, ownership of buildings, etc., or the possession of
land. Both are wrong, for the ownership of land usually carries
with it the ownership of whatever is attached to the land, and to
recognize two sets of ownership on the same piece of land would
not only be illogical, but might create unnecessary complications.
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To treat it as mere possession would not satisfactorily protect the
right of the superficiary. The Japanese Code, therefore, has given a
special place to this right, which with emphyteusis, is the broadest
right that exists as regards land next to ownership.
The definition of emphyteusis is found in Article 270 of the
Japanese Code. It runs thus: "An emphyteuticary is one who pos-
sesses the right on payment of rent as a fanner to cultivate the land
of another person, or to rear upon it horses and cattle." Emphyteu-
sis diffeks from superficies in the fact that it confers the right to
cultivate the land or to rear upon it horses and cattle and entails
the payment of rent. It also differs from superficies in regard to
the. length of time for which it may be created. There is a special
provision in Article 278 on this point to the effect that the duration
of the right of emphyteusis shall be from twenty to fifty years. If
a right of emphyteusis is created for a longer period than fifty years
it must be reduced to that limit. There is no such provision with
reference to superfices. The compensation for emphyteusis cannot
be paid once for all at the time of the creation of the right, for the
word rent means annual rent. This is simply the recognition of a
Japanese custom which prevailed for hundreds of years previous to
the codification. As to duration, however, the Code has departed
from the custom, for formerly a sort of perpetual lease could be
created which was interminable without the consent of the lessee,
nor could the rent thereof be altered without his assent. In the
French Code no such right in rem is recognized. The correspond-
ing provisions may be found in the Third Book, under the heading
Du contrat de lonage, or the contract of letting, where the letting of
land and houses is treated in connection with the letting of personal
property and the hiring of work and labor. In spite of the fact that
the framers of the Japanese Code tried to avoid the creation of rights
in rem wherever it was possible, this species of right is given an
important place as a right in rein. The reason is obvious: Japan
has been from time immemorial an agricultural country. The land
has been the chief source of revenue. Hence there were minute cus-
toms regarding the dispositions which might be made of land, among
Which a right very nearly corresponding to emphyteusis occupied an
important place. The Code simply adopted the custom with neces-
sary modifications.
Easements or Servitudes.-The French Code defines servitude
from the standpoint of duty and says that a servitude is a charge
imposed upon land for the use and benefit of land belonging to a
different owner. The Japanese Code defines it from the standpoint
of right. Article 28o reads thus: "A person in whom a right of
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easement is vested has the right to make use of the land of another
person for the benefit of his own land in accordance with the object
specified in the act creating the right." The land for the benefit of
which other land is used, is usually called dominant tenement and the
latter is styled servient tenement. Hence the mistaken notion arises
that there is a relation of right and duty between two pieces of land,
that a right is vested in the dominant tenement and the correspond-
ing duty is imposed on the servient tenement. It is well enough to
speak thus figuratively for the purpose of explanation, but we must
not be led to draw the false conclusion that a right can be vested in
a thing and a duty may be imposed upon a thing. The above defini-
tion presupposes that an easement is created by the act of the parties.
The Japanese law differs from the French on this point, as has been
indicated before, for a large number of rights which are treated as
limits of ownership, in the former, are classed in the latter with
servitudes, both as created by the act of the parties and by the opera-
tion of law. But this should not be interpreted to mean that such
a right can not be acquired by prescription, for the rules relating
to acquisitive and extinctive prescription, being placed among the
General Provisions are applicable to all classes of rights, unless a
special and express exception is stated. Not only is no such excep-
tion made in this case, but special provisions are inserted in Article
289 and the subsequent articles for the application of the general
rules of prescription.
The German Civil Code recognizes another kind of servitude
which may be styled personal servitude, that is, a right vested in a
person irrespective of his own land, to make use of the land of
another. This is not found in the Japanese Code, the reason being
that the creation of a right in rem over a thing owned by another
person ought to be avoided when it is possible, and because there
was no urgent reason for the establishment of such a right irrespec-
tive of the ownership of land.
Liens.-Four kinds of rights in rem remain to be noticed. They
are Liens, Preferential Rights, Pledges and Mortgages. All these
differ from the rights treated of before, in the fact that they may'be
called secondary rights for securing rights in personam.
The Japanese Code devotes a chapter to liens. It defines a lien
in the following terms: "If a person who has the possession of a
thing which belongs to another has a claim against the owner arising
out of the thing in question, he may detain the thing until his claim
is satisfied. But this rule does not apply to cases where the time
for satisfaction has not yet arrived." "The provisions of the pre-
ceding clause shall not be applied to cases where possession had its
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origin in an unlawful act." The Code then proceeds to determine
what a person may, and may not do, in respect of the thing over
which he has the right of lien, and ends by providing for its extinc-
tion. In the French Code this subject is not included under an
independent heading, but provisions relating to it are scattered here
and there as occasion or necessity arises; e. g., Article 867, where
right of lien is given to the one of several co-heirs, who has incurred
expenses in respect of the property inherited; Articles 1612, 1613,
1673, where rules are specified for rights of lien arising out of sales.
If the main object of codification is to simplify and systematize the
various rules of law, I need not dwell on the advantage of the Japan-
ese. Code as regards this matter.
Preferential Rights.-No provisions for preferential rights are
found in the German Civil Code. But they are made the subject-
matter of the law of bankruptcy, the reason given being that the
question of preferential rights arises only when the debtor is insol-
vent and that therefore, they ought not be provided for in the
substantive law. If this reasoning is correct, then the rules relating
to pledges and mortgages ought also to be excluded from the Civil
Code, for so long as a debtor can satisfy the claims of all his cred-
itors, no questions will be raised regarding the securities for his
debts.
According to the Japanese Code, preferential rights are either
general or special. A general preferential right covers all the
property of the debtor, while a special preferential right holds good
only with reference to a particular piece of property. -A person in
whose favor an obligation exists, based upon any of the following
grounds has a preferential right in all the property of the debtor:
i. Expenses for the common benefit, that is, the expenses incurred
for the common benefit of the creditors in regard to the preservation,
liquidation or distribution of the debtor's property; 2. Funeral
expenses; 3. Wages of employees; 4. Supplies of the necessaries
of life.
Special preferential rights are rights that can be exercised in
rela'tion to special pieces of property, whether movables or immov-
ables. A person in whose favor an obligation exists, based on one
of the following grounds, has a preferential right as regards particu-
lar movables belonging to the debtor: I. Hiring of an immovable;
2. Lodging in an inn; 3. Transportation of travelers or goods;
4. Official misconduct by public officers; 5. Preservation of mova-
bles; 6. Sale of movables; 7. Supply of seeds, young plants and
manure; 8. Agricultural or industrial services.
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Special preferential rights in immovables are given when art
obligation exists based on one of the following groufids: i. Pres-
,ervation of an immovable; 2. Work done upon an immovable;
3. Sale of an immovable.
The French Code provides for the protection of whatever
expenses may be incurred in the last illness and also for the protec-
tion of those who supplied the purchase money of immovables, by
giving a preferential right over movables in the former and over
immovables in the latter case. I do not see the necessity of increas-
ing the list of preferential rights by the inclusion of these cases.
Preferential rights are special rights conferred on particular creditors
to satisfy their claims in full, without any consideration whether
the remainder would or would not be sufficient to meet the demands
of general creditors. Such right ought to be conferred sparingly.
A preferential right is to be exercised over the thing in respect
of which the right exists. It so happens sometimes that the thing
is destroyed, but something else remains in its stead. A house may
be burned down and a right may arise therefrom to receive the
insurance money. Without special provision the preferential right
will not be extended to such a case. Such provision is made in
Article 304 of the Japanese Code, wherein it is stated that a preferen-
tial right may be exercised against money or other things which the
debtor is to receive by reason of the sale, letting or loss of the
subject of the right or damage to it, but the holder of the preferential
right must make a judicial seizure of such money or thing before it
is paid or delivered. These provisions are necessary to give full
effect to preferential rights, but they are absent fron the French
and the German laws.
In case of conflict between a general preferential right and a
special preferential right over the same thing, the French law gives
precedence to the former (Article 2105). On this point the Japan-
ese Code makes the contrary provision. Article 329 may be rendered
thus: "If a general preferential right conflicts with a special pre-
ferential right the latter takes precedence; but the preferential right
on account of expenses for the common benefit takes precedence as
against all creditors who are benefited thereby." The right of a
creditor who has a special preferential right is limited to a particular
thing, while the right of a creditor with a general preferential right
extends to all the property of the debtor; therefore, if, like the French
law, precedence should be given to the latter, it is possible that the
former might be entirely deprived of protection. This would nullify
the reason for which such special protection is given. The Japanese
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Code is in accordance with the raison d'~tre of special preferential
rights.
Pledge.-Pledge, or Shichiken of the Japanese Code, corresponds
to nantissement of the French Code. It is a class of security in
which the possession of the thing given for security is transferred
to the pledgee. It may be created in respect of movables, immov-
ables, and rights over property. In the last case the delivery of
deed or other evidence of proprietary rights takes place.
Mortgage.-Mortgage, or Tei-to-ken of the Japanese Code, corre-
sponds to Hypothbques of the French Code. The French Code
defines it to be a real right over immovables appropriated to the pay-
ment of an obligation (Article 2114). The provision of the Japan-
ese Code may be rendered as follows: "A mortgagee has in respect
of the immovable given to him as security by the debtor or a third
person, without possession being transferred, the right to receive
payment of his claim in advance of other creditors." It will be seen
that neither the French nor the Japanese law gives the mortgagee
the right to foreclose, but only gives him power to sell the property
and receive payment of- the obligation out of the proceeds.
In the French law "hypothques" are of three classes: hypoth-
ques legales; hypothques judiciaires; and hypothques convention-
diles. The rights of a married woman over the immovables of
her husband as security for the management of her property,
and the similar rights of a ward over the immovables of the guardian
come under the denomination of legal hypothecation. In these cases
the security is created by the operation of law. Judicial hypotheca-
tion is created by process before a court of law, e. g., by an attach-
ment of property. Conventional hypothecations are created by act
of the parties. The Japanese Code only recognizes the last species.
For the protection of married women and wards, the Japanese Code
gives power to the married woman and family council respectively,
to demand from the husband or the guardian as the case may be,
sufficient security which need not necessarily be in the form of
immovables. It is also doubtful whether a preference over other
creditors should be given to a creditor whose right was not originally
secured, simply because he was quick in levying an attachment upon
the property of the debtor. At least, that was the view of the
framers of the Japanese Code and hence judicial hypothecation is
not recognized by our law.
[Remainder to appear in June issue.]
